Tyler Hammond v. City of Wilkes-Barre by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-26-2015 
Tyler Hammond v. City of Wilkes-Barre 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Tyler Hammond v. City of Wilkes-Barre" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 303. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/303 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 





UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






TYLER HAMMOND; ANTONIA HAMMOND, a/k/a Antonia Camera, 




CITY OF WILKES-BARRE; MAYOR THOMAS M. LEIGHTON, Individually and in 
his Official Capacity; WILLIAM E. VINSKO, JR., Individually and in his Official 
Capacity as City Attorney; LEO A. GLODZIK, III 
______________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 3-09-cv-02310) 
District Judge: Hon. Malachy E. Mannion 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 5, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 






SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Tyler and Antonia Hammond (the “Hammonds”) sued the City of Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania (the “City”), Mayor Thomas M. Leighton, Assistant City Attorney William 
E. Vinsko, Jr., and Leo Glodzik, III (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Glodzik 
was a state actor and, with the approval of these public officials, destroyed the 
Hammonds’ personal property and encroached upon their real property.  Because Glodzik 
is not a state actor and the record does not show that the public officials were involved in 
Glodzik’s actions, the District Court properly granted Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment and we will affirm.  
I 
The Hammonds owned a home adjacent to a City-owned property known as the 
Old River Road Bakery (the “Bakery Property”).  The Hammonds stored personal 
property on the Bakery Property, including “garden pruners,” fruit trees, topsoil, 
radiators, a bathtub, vegetables, firewood, bricks, and metal fencing.  App. 160-62. 
On July 31, 2009, Glodzik signed an Agreement of Sale (the “Agreement”) to 
purchase the Bakery Property from the City.1  The Agreement provided that Glodzik 
would “take possession of the Property in its ‘as is’ condition as of the date of the 
Agreement.”  App. 1015.  After signing the Agreement,2 Glodzik “started cleaning up the 
                                                 
1 Given the unrebutted evidence that the Bakery Property was a single property 
entirely owned by the City, the Hammonds failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
that the Bakery Property sold to Glodzik did not include the land where the Hammonds 
stored their personal property. 
2 The Hammonds contend on appeal that Glodzik may have destroyed their 
property before signing the Agreement in July 2009.  This argument fails for two reasons.  
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property” and “secur[ing] the area” to maintain insurance coverage.  App. 621.  To this 
end, he removed the Hammonds’ personal property and built a fence.  He testified that no 
one from the City directed him to remove the Hammonds’ property or was aware that he 
might do so. 
The Hammonds were not present when their property was removed.  Their friend, 
Kevin Dougherty, testified that he recalled seeing Glodzik driving “a bulldozer going 
through [the Hammonds’] garden” and that Glodzik “was by himself.”  App. 373-74.  
Dougherty further testified that, when he confronted Glodzik, Glodzik told him to “[c]all 
the mayor, call whoever you want, if there is anything on here, you know, I have a right 
to move it.”  App. 385.  No one saw Leighton on the property, but Darren Stucker, who 
lived near the Hammonds, testified that he “saw city vehicles,” Vinsko, and “a code 
enforcement guy” for the City near the Bakery Property around the time the Hammonds’ 
property was removed.  App. 313.  Stucker surmised that the City allowed Glodzik to 
enter the property to clean it up, as the Bakery Property “was chained and locked with 
[C]ity locks on it.”  App. 319. 
                                                                                                                                                             
First, the Hammonds did not raise this argument before the District Court, and it is 
therefore waived.  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 834-35 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Second, the argument lacks factual support: no witness definitively testified 
Glodzik’s actions predated the Agreement. 
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In addition to the property destruction, the Hammonds testified that Glodzik 
erected a fence that encroaches on their property.3  When Antonia Hammond confronted 
Glodzik about the fence, he told her, “Go ahead and call city hall, they’re all my friends, 
they’re all my buddies.”  App. 172.  Antonia Hammond called 911.  Although police did 
not respond, Vinsko came to the property, tried to calm Hammond down, and told her 
that Glodzik did not need a permit to erect the fence.4  Vinsko subsequently sent the 
Hammonds a letter assuring them that Glodzik had “always complied with the City’s 
Ordinances” and that Vinsko would “monitor this matter to be sure that remains the 
case.”  App. 286.  To this end, Vinsko arranged to send an inspector to investigate 
allegations that Glodzik had destroyed property and done “work on the [Bakery Property] 
without a permit.”  App. 528-29.  An inspector found that Glodzik lacked the required 
permits and assessed a fine. 
The Hammonds filed a complaint against Glodzik, Leighton, Vinsko, and the City, 
seeking relief under § 1983 for alleged violations of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.5  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants under § 1983, reasoning that Glodzik was not a state actor, Leighton and 
                                                 
3 Because our analysis turns on whether Glodzik was a state actor and on whether 
Leighton or Vinsko was personally involved, whether and to what extent the fence 
encroaches is immaterial. 
4 Vinsko and Leighton testified that they did not know that Glodzik was going to 
destroy the Hammonds’ property or erect a fence.  
5 The Hammonds also brought state common law and statutory claims that were 
dismissed.  The Hammonds identified the orders dismissing these claims in their notice of 
appeal but did not discuss them in their brief and therefore have waived the appeal of 
these orders.  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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Vinsko were not personally involved, and the City could not be held independently liable.  
The Hammonds appeal.6 
II 
A 
 We first address the Hammonds’ § 1983 claims against Glodzik.7  Under § 1983, a 
plaintiff “must show that the defendants (1) were state actors who (2) violated his rights 
under the Constitution or federal law.”  Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 
165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2004).  The question of whether the Hammonds have met the first of 
these two requirements “is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth 
Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights fairly attributable to the State?”  
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (internal quotation marks and citation 
                                                 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing facts and making 
reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”  
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “[W]here a non-moving party fails sufficiently to establish the existence 
of an essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, there is 
not a genuine dispute with respect to a material fact.”  Id.  Although we give the non-
moving party the benefit of reasonable inferences, “an inference based upon a speculation 
or conjecture does not create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary 
judgment.”  Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
7 The Hammonds argue that Glodzik, who “never filed one opposing paper” 
before the District Court, has effectively admitted all material facts as stated by the 
Hammonds.  Appellant Br. 28-29; see App. 4 n.2.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
grant district courts broad latitude to “issue any . . . appropriate order” if a party has 
failed to address another party’s assertion of fact at summary judgment.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(e)(4).  In light of the record, we conclude that the District Court acted appropriately 
by granting summary judgment in Glodzik’s favor. 
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omitted).  In answering this question, “the facts are crucial,” Crissman v. Dover Downs 
Entm’t, Inc., 289 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2002), and it is “only by sifting facts and 
weighing circumstances [that] the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct 
[can] be attributed its true significance,” Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 
715, 722 (1961).  The “central purpose” of this inquiry is “to assure that constitutional 
standards are invoked when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific 
conduct of which the plaintiff complains.”  Crissman, 289 F.3d at 239 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis in original).  The Supreme Court has deemed private parties to 
be state actors in several different circumstances, including where: (1) the private party 
has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil 
Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 932-39 (1982); or (2) the state has so far insinuated itself into a 
position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint 
participant in the challenged activity, see Burton, 365 U.S. at 724-25. 
 The Hammonds contend Glodzik should be treated as a state actor because the 
City gave him access to the Bakery Property and because Leighton and Vinsko allowed 
Glodzik’s actions.  The record, however, shows that Glodzik, as the equitable owner of 
the Bakery Property, was acting as a private individual in clearing it.  See Bauer v. Hill, 
110 A. 346, 347 (Pa. 1920) (“Whenever an unconditional agreement has been made for 
the sale of land . . . , it may properly be referred to and treated as sold.”).  Even if the City 
unlocked the Bakery Property to allow Glodzik access, it did so after Glodzik became the 
equitable owner of the property.  Thus, the City and Glodzik were acting independently 
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of each other as the seller and buyer of property.  Glodzik’s remark that he had “friends” 
in “city hall,” App. 172, does not change the analysis.  Inferring interdependence with the 
state from such bluster would be the type of “inference based upon a speculation or 
conjecture” that cannot defeat summary judgment.  Halsey, 750 F.3d at 287. 
 As to inferences that can be drawn from Leighton’s and Vinsko’s conduct, the 
evidence does not show that Vinsko or Leighton knew Glodzik intended to destroy any 
property or erect a fence that would encroach on the Hammonds’ property.  Even 
assuming they had knowledge of and did not prevent these acts, that would be 
insufficient to create state action.  Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 
(1999) (“Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the 
State is not state action.”).  Moreover, the allegation that they failed to take action is 
undermined by the fact that the City fined Glodzik after concluding he did work on the 
Bakery Property without a permit.  For these reasons, the Hammonds have not shown that 
Glodzik is a state actor and the District Court properly granted summary judgment in his 
favor. 
B 
 The District Court also appropriately granted summary judgment in favor of 
Leighton and Vinsko.  Municipal officials, such as Leighton and Vinsko, may be 
personally liable if they “participated in violating the [Hammonds’] rights, directed others 
to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their] 
subordinates’ violations.”  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 
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2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).8  The evidence does not show that Leighton or 
Vinsko was involved in Glodzik’s conduct.  With respect to the destruction of the 
Hammonds’ personal property, no one testified that Leighton or Vinsko was present, and 
Antonia Hammond’s recollection that someone at city hall assured her “that there were 
plans and proposals in place,” App. 236-37, does not support the contention that Leighton 
or Vinsko personally caused or acquiesced in Glodzik’s actions.  With respect to the 
construction of the fence, there is no evidence of Leighton’s involvement.  As to Vinsko, 
the evidence shows only that he wanted Glodzik’s actions to comply with the City’s 
requirements, and the City fined Glodzik when he failed to do so.  These actions are the 
antithesis of acquiescing in wrongful conduct.  Thus, the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Leighton and Vinsko. 
C 
 The Hammonds’ claim against the City also fails.  Because no City employee 
“inflicted . . . constitutional injury,” the City cannot be liable.  City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 
U.S. 796, 799 (1986).  Therefore, the District Court properly granted summary judgment 
in favor of the City. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                                 
8 As we noted in Santiago, courts “have expressed uncertainty as to the viability 
and scope of supervisory liability after [Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)].”  629 
F.3d at 30 n.8.  We need not address whether the scope of supervisory liability has 
narrowed, as Defendants are entitled to summary judgment “even under our existing 
supervisory liability test.”  Id. 
